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Global justice has become an increasingly common topic of 
concern and debate, and the relationship between international trade law 
and global justice is an increasingly accepted one.1  My goal in this 
Article is not to document these trends, nor is it to argue for why these 
are important and welcome developments.2  Instead, I propose to step 
back from specific arguments concerning justice and trade law and 
examine the ways in which we conceptualize the problem of global 
justice, particularly in view of globalization and the diversity of 
normative traditions it highlights.  My task in this Article is to examine 
three different approaches to this problem—three “takes,” if you will, 
on the question of global justice—drawn from Rawlsian liberalism, 
communitarianism, and consent theory.  By comparing these three 
approaches with respect to how they envision the relationship between 
trade law and justice, and how they respond to the challenges to global 
justice raised by normative pluralism, I hope to suggest new ways to 
craft a truly global approach to the problem of global justice and its 
relationship to international trade law, one that more fully takes into 
* The author would like to thank John Linarelli for his invitation to speak and for his 
intellectual companionship on these issues, and the staff of the La Verne Law Review for 
their excellent editorial work.  Thanks also to Joanna Kornafel for her research support.  I 
am indebted to Paulo Barrozo, Jeffrey Dunoff, Vlad Perju, and Diane Ring for their very 
helpful comments.  A special thank you to my partner Kim Garcia for the original idea to set 
these different takes side-by-side and see what they could say.  All errors and omissions 
remain very much my own. 
1. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Just Trade Under Law: Do We Need a Theory of Justice 
for International Trade Relations?, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 375 (2006) (the panel concluded 
“Yes,” there is a need for a theory of justice for international trade relations). 
 2. Ten or fifteen years ago, however, it would have been necessary to establish both 
the centrality of globalization and the relationship between trade law and justice as a 
prolegomena to any project such as this one. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Just Trade, 37 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 559 (2005) (noting historic resistance of the field to formal normative 
inquiry beyond trade economics). 
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account the challenges and opportunities of globalization. Before 
turning to the substance of this endeavor, I will start by explaining 
briefly what I mean by globalization and justice. 
I. GLOBALIZATION AND JUSTICE
In essence, globalization today is the dramatic compression of 
geographic space in human social relations.3  This compression of space 
is altering global social relations by interconnecting us in new and 
powerful ways, and both requiring and facilitating a shift in regulation 
away from the nation-state and towards new institutions and actors.4  As 
a consequence of such changes, our decisions regarding investment, 
consumption, and politics, to name a few, affect one another’s lives and 
fortunes as never before,5 making it necessary for us to think about new 
global institutions and global justice, not simply existing state and 
interstate institutions and domestic justice.   
What do we mean by justice? The term “justice” essentially 
describes a relationship between a society’s values and the results of its 
social processes.6  Consider, for example, when a court delivers a 
ruling, a legislature produces a bill, or an international conference 
negotiates a treaty.  These are social outcomes, the products of 
communal deliberation.  There are many ways we can evaluate these 
outcomes, such as through their effectiveness, legitimacy, or elegance.  
“Justice” evaluates these outcomes in terms of their consistency with 
the values of those subject to them.7  Such values, when applied to the 
exercise of public authority, we call the principles of justice.  The 
question of justice then, is whether people will judge a particular 
outcome consistent with core community values.
3. See, e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS
AND CULTURE 15–16 (1999); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 64
(1990) (discussing globalization as intensification of interdependence through spatio-
temporal compression). 
 4. Effective regulatory decision-making increasingly involves the meta-state level, 
leading to a system in which states still have a preeminent, but not the only, role.  See, e.g.,
ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF 
THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996). 
 5. Global financial crises have a way of painfully and dramatically bringing this point 
home. See MARTIN WOLF, FIXING GLOBAL FINANCE 28–57 (2008) (discussing financial 
crises in an era of globalization); Jeffrey E. Garten, Lessons for the Next Financial Crisis,
78 FOREIGN AFF. 76 (1999) (discussing the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s). 
6. See FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL
THEORY OF JUST TRADE 44–46 (2003) [hereinafter GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND 
JUSTICE]. 
7. Id.
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The answer to this question will vary according to the people 
involved and their particular core principles—that is the difference 
between the concept of justice and the many substantive conceptions of 
justice that we find in the world.8  This inquiry has been carried out 
primarily in domestic societies in which the characteristics of justice 
have been developed with reference to the many policy issues that arise 
out of domestic social interaction.   
The significance of globalization lies in its transformation and 
extension of these social interactions and social processes beyond 
national boundaries.9  When we speak of global justice we are arguing, 
in effect, that globalization is creating social outcomes and processes of 
the sort that make justice relevant at the global level, and that we need 
to consider whether these outcomes and processes are indeed acceptable 
in terms of core principles.10
But whose core principles, and which ones?  Put another way, is 
global justice possible, and is the very idea of it coherent?  Such 
questions constitute a major debate among philosophers, political 
scientists, and globalization theorists.11  I am not going to attempt to 
resolve the debate in this Article, nor will I attempt to survey the many 
theories of global justice in play today.12  Instead, I will look at the 
central problem all these approaches encounter, a problem which none 
of them has completely solved: how do we establish a truly global basis 
for global justice?  One consequence of globalization is that we are 
more aware than ever of the diversity in the world: a plurality of 
different traditions, cultures, and languages.13  In the face of such 
pluralism, how do we put the “global” in global justice? 
Each of the three approaches examined in this Article—liberal 
internationalism, global communitarianism, and consent-based trade 
theory—offers a different way of addressing this central problem of 
 8. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5–6 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE]. 
9. See Frank J. Garcia, Globalization, Global Community and the Possibility of 
Global Justice, B.C. L. SCH. FAC. PAPERS, Paper 33 (2005), available at http://lsr.nellco. 
org/bc_lsfp/33/ [hereinafter Garcia, Global Community].
10. Id.
11. See GLOBALIZATION THEORY: APPROACHES AND CONTROVERSIES (David Held & 
Anthony McGrew eds., 2007) (surveying the range of globalization theory). 
 12. For useful surveys of contemporary approaches to transnational justice, see Simon 
Caney, International Distributive Justice, 49 POL. STUD. 974 (2001); Onora O’Neill, 
Transnational Justice, in POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 276, 276–304 (David Held ed., 1991). 
 13. On the problem of pluralism and international law, see Paul Schiff Berman, A
Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301 (2007) (suggesting an 
approach based on the policy science of the New Haven School).  
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normative pluralism.  Each “take” assumes a different conception of the 
relationship between international trade law and justice, and each makes 
different demands on trade law with respect to the promotion of global 
justice.  By setting these three approaches side by side, highlighting 
their strengths and weaknesses, I hope to suggest some new directions 
for the trade and justice inquiry, which might capitalize on the strengths 
of all three takes while avoiding some of the pitfalls. 
Before I begin, let me clarify one final point concerning a fourth 
approach to global justice—cosmopolitanism—and why I do not 
include it.  The cosmopolitan approach to global justice seeks to ground 
global justice in a universal appeal to human dignity.14  Some of the 
most ambitious and elegant arguments for global justice are 
cosmopolitan in nature.15  I do not in any way object to the liberal basis 
of cosmopolitanism, its human rights language, or its vision of a just 
world order built on human dignity.16 However, I think 
cosmopolitanism has one serious vulnerability which has led me to look 
to other routes: in a multi-ethnic, pluralistic world of different religious, 
philosophical, legal, and cultural traditions, I do not consider 
cosmopolitanism particularly well-suited to serve as the basis for a truly 
global approach to justice.  I believe it can be more accurately 
characterized as a liberal ideal of global justice with considerable 
rhetorical or symbolic power, but without a strong claim to universal 
validity; it is more a vision than a path at this point. 
For this reason, I am interested in developing alternative or 
supplementary approaches to the question of global justice.  In 
particular, I am interested in seeing what kind of work can be done by 
looking in three other directions.  I will begin with two takes based on 
political theories, which might not initially seem congenial to global 
justice: Rawls’ famous theory of liberal justice, which he confined to 
justice within states, not between them;17 and communitarian theories of 
justice, which limit justice to certain communities, specifically nation-
states.18  The result in both Take One and Take Two is an approach to 
14. See, e.g., SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 
3–4 (2005) [hereinafter CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS]. 
 15. Most recently, for example, in the work of Simon Caney, and stretching all the way 
back to Kant himself. See id., EMANUEL KANT, Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 
(Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1977). 
16. See, e.g., CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
 17. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THE LAW OF 
PEOPLES]. 
 18. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
30 (Basic Books 1983) [hereinafter WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE].
Garcia (4-28)_Final Version macro 2 4/29/2010  10:18 AM 
2010] THREE TAKES ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 327 
global justice that solves some problems while creating others, 
illuminating the limits of each theory as much as it does the political 
situation each one addresses. 
For Take Three, I will adopt an entirely different approach to the 
question, which requires less in the way of traditional political theory, 
but hopefully lies closer to our lived experience of trade and exchange 
generally, and see what can be built from these materials.  In Take 
Three, I begin with the ways in which our language and law recognize 
that theft, coercion, exploitation, and trade are not the same thing, 
though value may change hands in all cases.  Using Simone Weil’s 
notions about consent, I try to work out exactly why that might be so, 
and what implications this has for trade and for the question of justice.
Hopefully Take Three fills some gaps identified by the other two takes, 
particularly with respect to the challenge of finding a consensus for 
global norms in a pluralistic context. 
II. TAKE ONE - INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, OR: GLOBAL JUSTICE AS THE 
FOREIGN POLICY OF LIBERAL STATES
One approach to global justice is to deliberately stop short of 
trying to develop global norms, and instead root justice in the foreign 
policy of liberal states.19  This approach does not attempt to look for or 
establish a shared normative basis among states or peoples; instead, it 
simply looks at liberal states, and asks the following question: what are 
the foreign policy obligations on liberal states by virtue of their 
liberalism?  In other words, are liberal states obligated to pursue a 
liberal vision of global justice by virtue of the fact that they are liberal?  
In the traditional view of liberal political theory, states are free to 
pursue pragmatism and realism in their international relations, 
regardless of their domestic political values.20  They can embrace 
constitutional democracy at home, and realpolitik abroad.  Underlying 
this view is the assumption that foreign relations take place in a sort of 
value-free zone.21  On this view, there may be domestic justice, but 
 19. The leading example of this is Rawls’ THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 17.  For 
reasons discussed further below, I am instead basing Take One on an international extension 
of Rawls’ domestic model of Justice as Fairness.  See infra Part II.A. 
20. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International 
Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 398 (1997) (discussing the “Lockean dilemma” in 
liberal constitutionalism). 
21. Id.
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there is no global justice: only politics and power, and to some extent, 
law.22   
One way to challenge this view is to take the cosmopolitan 
approach, and assert that there are overarching principles of human 
dignity that apply even in international relations.  Certainly human 
rights law tries to do this at the level of positive law, but as discussed 
above, a cosmopolitan approach to global justice leads directly to the 
problem of how to justify truly global norms.  Instead, Take One 
embodies a more limited approach; namely, to attempt to hold liberal 
states accountable abroad to their political principles at home.  How 
does one do this? 
A. The Model 
One starting point is in the work of Lea Brilmayer, an international 
legal theorist.  Her project begins with this question: how are 
international acts by states justified?23  Her answer is her so-called 
“vertical thesis”: treat the justification of international acts as a question 
of the legitimacy of state action.24  For Brilmayer, governmental action 
that extends across international borders is governmental action 
nonetheless,25 and must be justified normatively by reference to some 
form of political theory or it will lack legitimacy as a state policy.  
Thus, the authority for transboundary state action is ultimately derived 
from its justification in domestic political theory.26  Such justification is 
“vertical,” in that it is drawn “upwards” from the political norms 
regulating the underlying relationship between the individual and the 
relevant political institution.27  This is in contrast to the traditional 
“horizontal” approach to state morality, which analyzes international 
ethical questions by reference to the ethics between co-equal state 
actors.28  In other words, justification comes out of the political morality 
governing the state’s relationship with its own citizens, rather than out 
of any notion of the morality of a state’s relationship to other states.29
22. See, e.g., STANLEY HOFFMANN, Ethics and International Affairs, in DUTIES BEYOND 
BORDERS 1, 1–43 (1981) (sketching out the limits of moral choice in international relations 
from the viewpoint of a “Liberal Realist”).  
 23. LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS 11 (1989).
24. Id. at 2. 
25. Id. at 11. 
26. Id. at 22. 
27. Id. at 2. 
28. Id.
 29. BRILMAYER, supra note 23, at 29.  In this way, Brilmayer’s theory is part of a 
general shift away from a “society of states” model of international law, and towards a 
global public law and a global society of persons.  See Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and 
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Brilmayer’s theory is a powerful argument for the view that states 
act within a coherent moral universe, in which the legitimacy of all their 
actions, both domestic and international, derives from their observance 
of the same set of core political principles.30
Thus, for the governments of liberal states, this entails that they act 
as liberal states in their dealings abroad, in the same way their citizens 
expect them to act as liberal states domestically.31
This leads to the next question: if liberal states must act as liberal 
states abroad, what does a liberal foreign policy look like?  With respect 
to global justice in particular, what does a liberal foreign policy entail in 
the area of economic relations and economic justice?  According to the 
vertical thesis, one must begin by reference to the state’s domestic 
liberalism, which in the case of this Article will involve principles of 
economic justice.  Therefore, in order to work out one possible model 
for what a liberal state’s foreign policy might look like with respect to 
economic justice, I will employ Rawls’ famous theory of “Justice as 
Fairness.”32
I have opted for this theory, despite its problematic relationship to 
the question of justice across borders,33 for two principal reasons.  First, 
for reasons I have argued elsewhere, I find it to be the most powerful 
liberal approach to the central problem of inequality as it affects 
economic justice, in that it most fully grapples with the liberal dilemma 
of moral equality and natural inequality.34  Second, as I have also 
argued elsewhere, I am not convinced by Rawls’ own reasons for 
refusing to extend his theory to problems of transboundary justice;35
instead, I find the logic of his argument for domestic justice convincing, 
the Theory of International Law, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 9, 10–12 (2005) [hereinafter 
Garcia, Theory of International Law]. 
 30.  BRILMAYER, supra note 23.  The justification of a state’s international acts “must 
be analyzed by reference to the constituting political theory that grants it authority to act 
domestically.”  Id.
 31. Frank J. Garcia, Developing a Normative Critique of International Trade Law: 
Special & Differential Treatment (forthcoming 2010) University of Bremen TranState 
Working Paper No. 66, 2007, available at http://www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de/pages/ 
pubApBeschreibung.php?SPRACHE=en&ID=76 [hereinafter Garcia, Normative Critique].
 32. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 8.  
 33. Rawls does not extend his theory to matters of international justice, and in THE
LAW OF PEOPLES is critical of those who do, opting himself for a more limited “duty of 
assistance” on matters of economic justice.  See RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 
17; Frank J. Garcia, The Law of Peoples, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 659 (2001) (book review).  
 34. Other liberal theories of justice such as utilitarianism and libertarianism founder in 
one way or another on the problem of inequality.  See GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND 
JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 110–18. 
35. Id. at 124–28. 
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regardless of national boundaries.36  In the discussion which follows, I 
am assuming familiarity with the outlines of Rawls’ basic theory, and 
only note a few issues of significance which arise in its extension to 
transboundary justice and international trade law.   
Rawls is concerned with inequalities that arise in the distribution 
of social primary goods, such as wealth, status, rights, privileges, and 
opportunities.37  Inequalities in the natural distribution of natural 
primary goods, such as size, strength, brain capacity, and basic health, 
deeply affect peoples’ life chances, but are not themselves the subject of 
justice because they are arbitrary natural facts; rather, it is how a society 
responds to such inequalities that forms the basic subject of justice.38
The fundamental problem of distributive justice is that inequalities in 
natural primary goods often lead, through the operation of social 
institutions, to inequalities in the social distribution of social primary 
goods.39  Such inequalities in social primary goods are not deserved, 
since they are deeply influenced by arbitrary, underlying natural 
inequalities.
Rawls argues that as a result, the basic structure of society must be 
arranged “so that these contingencies work for the good of the least 
fortunate.”40  The distribution of natural talents is to be considered a 
common asset, and society is to be structured so that this asset works for 
the good of the least well-off.  Through his celebrated account of the 
“Original Position” as a hypothetical problem involving the choice of 
first principles, Rawls develops this view into the theory of Justice as 
Fairness, in particular the “Difference Principle,” which states that 
inequalities in the distribution of social primary goods are justifiable 
only to the extent they benefit the least advantaged.41 Satisfying this 
criterion could entail a variety of social measures, ranging from altering 
the structure of incentives to reward actions which benefit the least 
advantaged, such as the charitable gifts deduction found in income tax 
codes, to the outright redistribution of private wealth through 
progressive tax and welfare legislation.  Rawls contends that a society 
 36. All the more so if one takes a Brilmayer approach, in which it is precisely the 
domestic liberalism of a state which furnishes the starting point for its transboundary 
liberalism.  See BRILMAYER, supra note 23, at 22. 
 37. The brief account of Rawls’ theory which follows is based on my summary in 
Garcia, Normative Critique, supra note 31, at 5–22.  
38. See, e.g., RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 100–08. 
39. Id. at 72. 
40. Id. at 102. 
41. Id. at 75. 
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so organized would meet the basic Kantian obligation of mutual respect: 
to treat each other as ends and not as means.42
So far, this is domestic Rawls—the starting point for determining 
the foreign policy implications of liberalism.  Having selected a body of 
domestic political theory to work with, the next step involves adapting 
the theory for use in an international context, involving, in this case, 
international trade law.  The key normative assumption underlying a 
Rawlsian account of inequality is that differences in natural 
endowments are undeserved.  In Rawls’ terms, they are “arbitrary from 
a moral point of view.”43  Translating this to the international setting, it 
is important to recognize that inequality works at two levels: on 
individuals, as in the domestic context, and between states (territorially-
associated groups of persons).44  Setting aside the issues of migration 
and conquest, states and the people born into them must, in general, 
accept the extent of resources to be found within their territories.45
These national boundaries and the resource endowments they 
encompass have a profound distributional impact on individuals’ life 
prospects.46
These natural inequalities at both the individual and state levels, 
the arbitrariness of their distribution and their social consequences, form 
the subject of justice in a transboundary setting.47  For liberal states, the 
task is to determine principles that can serve both as a standard for 
evaluating their transboundary social responses to natural inequalities, 
and as a guide to liberal states and the social institutions they influence 
when making distributive allocations that will impact social 
inequalities.48 Put in Rawlsian terms, we must determine the 
42. Id. at 179. 
43. Id. at 72. 
44. See Garcia, Normative Critique, supra note 31, at 7–10. 
 45. The arbitrariness of international borders and the particular resource “bundles” they 
circumscribe is becoming a key issue in global social policy today.  See generally FREE
MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 
(Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992). 
46. See, e.g., Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
195, 198 (1994) (asserting borders have tremendous distributive impact). 
 47. Rawls would not agree, as he considers material inequalities as the subject of 
domestic justice.  See RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 17; however, for the reasons 
I argue elsewhere, Rawls’ position on the exclusively domestic nature of material inequality 
is problematic (see GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 124–28).  
But see Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
349 (2005) (offering a thoughtful defense of Rawls’ position in THE LAW OF PEOPLES that
domestic institutions are the chief determinant of material inequality).   
 48. Garcia, Normative Critique, supra note 31, at 13. 
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relationship between the principles of Justice as Fairness developed in a 
domestic setting, and these issues of transboundary distributive justice.  
For the purposes of this Article, the heart of the argument is that 
representatives in the Original Position would choose the same 
principles of Justice as Fairness for transboundary issues as they do for 
domestic issues, because the choice problem is the same.49  Under 
circumstances in which people do not know their particular social and 
economic position in the world, including what state they will be born 
into and what resources that state commands, they would choose 
principles of justice which would maximize the social distribution to the 
least advantaged individual or state, because they may turn out to be 
that person or be born into that state.50  Put another way, I am arguing 
that as an element of a just foreign policy, liberal states must engage in 
transboundary acts and policies which satisfy the Difference Principle.51
Having adopted Justice as Fairness for international economic 
issues as well as domestic ones, the examination now turns to 
contemporary international economic law.  The task becomes applying 
these principles to liberal states’ actions when they respond to or affect 
natural or social inequalities through international trade law.  
Interestingly, the conclusion is that justice requires free trade, but that 
free trade alone is not enough for a just global economic order. 
The core commitment of contemporary trade law is that of free 
trade: international economic relations are to be free, or as free as 
possible, from governmental restrictions in the form of tariff and non-
tariff barriers, and nondiscriminatory with respect to country of origin 
(the most-favored-nation rule) and domestic origin (the national 
 49. Thus simplified, we have glossed over several interesting technical issues.  For 
example, critics and proponents of a Rawlsian approach to international justice have argued 
whether a second, “international” Original Position is required, or whether the principles 
chosen in the “domestic” Original Position would, by extension and without further choice, 
apply to transboundary state action. See GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE, supra
note 6, at 131–33.  There, I opted for a second Original Position as most consistent with 
Rawls’ own (limited) approach to international justice, for reasons germane to my argument.  
Id. at 132.  For the purposes of this Article and in line with Brilmayer’s vertical thesis, it 
makes more sense to speak in terms of a single Original Position, as the principles of justice 
chosen there will apply equally to domestic and foreign policy choices. 
 50. For a fuller treatment, see GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE, supra note 6, 
at 131–36. 
 51. This is a separate question from the twin problems of international politics, namely 
what politics are necessary to enact such measures internationally, and what modifications 
or compromises to such commitments are necessary in view of the political realities of a 
fragmented illiberal international society.  These are formidable problems, but their 
difficulty does not detract from the transformative significance of accepting ab initio that 
liberal states have liberal foreign policy commitments, however realized or realizable. 
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treatment rule).52  The starting point, therefore, in the elaboration of a 
liberal theory of trade is to examine whether, from a normative point of 
view, this commitment to free trade is justifiable.53
One can deduce from the principle of Justice as Fairness that a 
well-ordered society requires free trade as a policy.54  However, free 
trade is not enough.  Adherence to the full extent of the principles of 
Justice as Fairness also requires that inequalities in the distribution of 
social primary goods be justified by their contribution to the well-being 
of the least advantaged.55  The reason for this is the problem of 
inequality and its effects on trade.   
The global inequality in natural resources leads, through a complex 
variety of domestic and international private and public actions and 
institutions, to social inequalities in wealth, privileges, rights, and 
opportunities.56  Empirical studies suggest that economic size does 
matter, and that these inequalities are not, on the whole, working for the 
benefit of the least advantaged—it is actually quite the reverse.57
Smaller economies are the most vulnerable to adverse changes in their 
trade in the global economy, and in the international economic law 
system.58  Thus, they face the most obstacles to economic development 
and effective competition.59
In light of these facts, applying Justice as Fairness to international 
trade leads to a very basic question, which liberal states must address in 
their international economic relations: given the fact of inequality and 
its adverse effects on the least advantaged (the smallest economies and 
the people living in them), how can the international economic system 
be restructured to ensure that such inequalities work to the benefit of the 
least advantaged?  This is where a set of trade rules known as special 
and differential treatment (S&D) can play a role.60
 52. For a clear and concise overview, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE,
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 20–38 (2d ed. 1999). 
 53. The discussion which follows is drawn from Garcia, Normative Critique, supra
note 31, at 13–15. 
 54. For an alternative approach justifying free trade as an actual principle of justice 
chosen in a Rawlsian original position, see Ethan B. Kapstein, Distributive Justice and 
International Trade, 13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 175, 175–82 (1999). 
 55. Garcia, Normative Critique, supra note 31, at 17. 
56. Id. at 20. 
57. Id.
58. Id. at 20–21. 
59. Id. at 21. 
60. See Garcia, Normative Critique, supra note 31, at 21.  S & D has been criticized as 
ineffective or worse.  See Jeffery L. Dunoff, Dysfunction, Diversion and the Debate Over 
Preferences: (How) Do Preferential Trade Policies Work?, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN 
THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 45 (Chantal Thomas & Joel R. Trachtman eds., 2009).  
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At the core of S&D is the practice of asymmetric trade 
liberalization, involving the terms on which states allow access to their 
markets and expect access in return.61  S&D attempts to secure the 
benefit of social inequality in developed countries, in the form of the 
wealth and resources of their markets, for the least advantaged states, 
through market access that is both preferential, in that it is on better 
terms than those received by larger economies, and non-reciprocal, in 
that larger economies cannot expect equivalent concessions from 
smaller economies in return.62  It is this asymmetry which enables S&D 
to play a key role in justifying inequalities in the international allocation 
of social goods.63  By opening their markets to exports from smaller 
economies on a preferential basis, large economies, in effect, place the 
consumption power of their larger, richer consumer market at the 
service of the smaller economies, which can increase their exports and 
thereby strengthen their economic base.64  Thus, preferential market 
access for developing countries allows the inequalities that manifest 
themselves in the form of wealthy consumer markets to work to the 
benefit of the least advantaged, thereby meeting the central criteria for 
liberal distributive justice.65
Applying the difference principle to trade law, and with an 
understanding of the role of the market as a manifestation of economic 
inequalities, a liberal theory of just trade would require liberal states to 
establish market access on terms that benefit the least advantaged, both 
unilaterally (i.e., through trade preferences) and through their role in 
multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).66
Having determined this mandate, the stage is now set for a detailed 
normative analysis and review of existing trade preferences and 
multilateral trade laws.   
It is impossible to carry out or even thoroughly summarize such an 
analysis within the confines of this Article; however I will state the 
conclusions which I have argued elsewhere.  First, while S&D, as 
Nevertheless, it represents the sole systematic effort within trade law to address the problem 
of inequality on a structural level. 
61. See Garcia, Normative Critique, supra note 31. 
62. Id. at 22. 
 63. Market access is managed through the two principal components of S&D: market 
access preferences and market protection mechanisms.  In this Article, I will focus on the 
market access branch of S&D.  For an evaluation of market protection mechanisms, as well 
as the wealth transfer aspects of S&D, see GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE, supra
note 6, at ch. 4. 
 64. Garcia, Normative Critique, supra note 31, at 23. 
65. Id.
66. Id.
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currently embodied in unilateral preference programs and multilateral 
WTO rules, plays an important role in justifying inequalities, a 
Rawlsian analysis reveals how much work still needs to be done to craft 
trade rules which truly satisfy the core requirement of a liberal theory of 
justice; namely, that social inequalities work to the benefit of the least 
advantaged.67  In case after case, the details of the rules and how they 
operate actually subvert the normative purpose and basic framework of 
such rules, working to the benefit of the most advantaged states instead 
of the least advantaged.68
Second, this basic form of analysis is not limited to trade law, but 
can be applied to any aspect of international economic law in which 
there are resources to be allocated, and in which states act either 
unilaterally or through international institutions to allocate such 
resources.  For example, one can also apply Justice as Fairness to the 
work of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, exploring what responsibilities liberal states might 
have within such institutions to influence their policies so as to benefit 
the least advantaged.69
B. Contributions and Limits of This Model 
To recapitulate, in this section I have outlined one “take” on the 
question of global justice and international trade law; namely, to 
approach justice as a matter of the foreign policy obligations of a liberal 
state with respect to transboundary questions of economic justice.  
Following Brilmayer’s vertical thesis, this approach has assumed a 
model of transboundary justice as essentially similar to domestic justice, 
in that it roots the legitimacy of state action in a state’s constitutive 
political theory, regardless of whether such action crosses territorial 
 67. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 147–92. 
68. Id.  To take only one example, the rules governing which goods are eligible for 
trade preferences (central to S&D) establish criteria which have more to do with the 
domestic industries and foreign policy goals of the granting state than they do the economic 
needs of the beneficiary state.  See id.
 69. Matters of international monetary and credit policy are significantly under-
theorized.  See Sanjay G. Reddy, Just International Monetary Arrangements, in GLOBAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 218, 218 (Christian Barry & Thomas W. Pogge eds., 
2005) (“[D]espite the acknowledged centrality of monetary arrangements in modern 
economies, they have received surprisingly little attention from philosophers concerned with 
distributive justice, whether in the national or the global context.”).  Id.  With respect to the 
IMF, one key question is whether their currency lending and intervention policies benefit 
the least advantaged.  For the World Bank, the question is whether the terms on which the 
Bank loans and manages development capital benefits the least advantaged.  Frank J. 
Garcia, Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions, in THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 23 (William J. Davey & John Jackson eds., 2008). 
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boundaries.  In this model, international trade law is subject to the same 
normative criteria as domestic law because the same liberal states are 
actively asserting their power in both arenas. 
The greatest advantage of this approach is that it is not contingent 
upon the existence of any global normative consensus on justice, or 
upon the persuasiveness of local theories of justice across national 
boundaries.  Instead, it confines itself to articulating what kind of global 
trade policy a liberal state should pursue in order to be consistent with 
its own normative commitments.  This would apply equally to situations 
in which the state acts unilaterally, and when it acts through an 
international organization by advocating for, or setting, that institution’s 
policies.
This offers advocates for global justice an immediately available 
set of normative and rhetorical tools with which to address the many 
pressing problems of global distributive justice, at least insofar as liberal 
states are actively involved, whether through their own policies or 
through the organizations they influence.  Reformers do not need to 
initially win any controversial theoretical battles, or design new global 
institutions.  Instead, they need only point out the global distributive 
ramifications of current normative commitments.  Such an approach 
also encourages greater coherence in liberal states between domestic 
and international policies.70
Take One also offers liberal states a familiar basis on which to 
evaluate their own transboundary actions, because it resembles the kind 
of evaluation already carried out for domestic policies.71  Precisely 
because it operates within the boundaries of traditional domestic 
political theory, this approach is particularly well-suited to offer 
concrete normative benchmarks for evaluating international law and 
policy.  As the abbreviated analysis of trade law and S&D above sought 
to illustrate, Justice as Fairness can be the basis for a robust, detailed 
critique of existing law, and can suggest specific reforms in law and 
institutional practice.  This is possible, in part, because Justice as 
Fairness yields a clear, normative benchmark for regulatory policy: are 
70. See Michael Javid, Increasing the Coherence of Global Economic Policy-Making—
Suggestions for Improving the Governance Structure of the International Economic Law 
Regime (Spring 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (discussing the 
benefits of policy coherence). 
 71. For example, Rawlsian analyses of domestic tax policy abound.  See, e.g., James 
Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1129 (2008); Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: 
What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004). 
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the rules designed so that the social process of allocation they structure 
work to the benefit of the least advantaged? 
However, as is often the case, the limits of this approach flow 
directly from its strengths.  By foregoing the search for a global 
normative theory, Take One articulates a strong claim on liberal states, 
but it cannot reach beyond liberal states to other states, some of which 
are those pursuing the most destructive policies.  This model does not 
offer arguments as to why illiberal states are obligated to pursue those 
foreign policies we in liberal states consider to be “just” or necessary, 
nor does it give us guidance on how to manage relations between liberal 
and illiberal states, a problem that preoccupied Rawls at the end of his 
life.72  I do not mean to minimize the significance of persuading even 
liberal states to follow a liberal theory of justice internationally—that by 
itself would be transformative.  However, the limits of this approach are 
built in at the theoretical level.  
Moreover, this approach reinforces two problematic aspects of 
international relations: the “society of states” model and the “liberal 
hegemony” problem.  First, by articulating the basis for transboundary 
liberalism in a state’s own domestic political theory, this approach 
undercuts the normative thrust of the human rights movement; namely, 
that states owe certain obligations to human beings as human beings, 
without the need for any mediating domestic theory.  In its strongest 
form, this is the essence of the cosmopolitan approach to global justice.  
Despite the limits of cosmopolitanism discussed above, it is clear that 
international society has moved beyond merely a society of states, and 
has encompassed, even in a limited degree, individuals as subjects of 
international law.73  In this sense, Take One can be seen as a retrograde 
movement, trading away individual normative and legal status for 
increased binding force. 
Second, by situating justice within the realm of unilateral state 
action and state influence over multilateral institutional policy, Take 
One reinforces the link between power and ideology in international 
relations.  In other words, when one factors in the preponderance of 
global economic power held by the U.S. and Europe states, together the 
most prominent liberal states, the stage is set for the critique of “justice” 
as the ideology which cloaks “liberal” states in their international 
pursuit of power and influence.74  Put another way, the objects of 
72. See RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 17. 
73. See Garcia, Theory of International Law, supra note 29, at 10–12. 
 74. It is difficult to evaluate the morality of a state’s foreign policy without a clear 
understanding of the moral framework of the institutions through which it acts.  See Nancy 
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unilateral state action or multilateral institutional rules, may have reason 
to resent the power which allows liberal states to carry out or enact their 
policies, however “liberal” they seem.  At its worst, a liberal foreign 
policy approach to transboundary justice becomes a kind of “liberal 
triumphalism.” 
Finally, this approach does not, by itself, offer a theory of global 
justice which applies to international organizations directly—in other 
words, it does not offer an independent normative argument for binding 
international institutions qua institutions to principles of distributive 
justice.75  Instead, if such institutions happen to follow just policies, it 
will only be because they are controlled by a majority of liberal states, 
who have decided to fulfil their liberal commitments and have 
encountered or created the politics necessary to enact this agenda, not 
because the institution is independently obligated to do so. 
For all these reasons, I would characterize the approach in Take 
One as international justice, not global justice.  As a theory of liberal 
state obligation, it can play an important role in the pursuit of global 
justice, but standing alone, there is nothing truly global about it. 
III. TAKE TWO - GLOBALIZATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF GLOBAL 
JUSTICE
The preceding section presented an approach to global justice 
which presupposes that global social relations have not changed in any 
significant way.  In essence, this limits justice to international justice, or 
justice between states and through states, for their citizens.  This 
allowed us to take a strong normative base (obligations of liberal justice 
on liberal states) and extend it to cover transboundary distributive 
issues, but its limit was its reach—by definition it can only apply 
directly to liberal states and to global institutions through the votes and 
policy influence of those states. 
But what about a truly global justice—is that possible?  If we are 
not going to proceed on the basis of a universalist account of political 
morality, as cosmopolitanism does (which has some serious difficulties, 
as mentioned before), and if we are not yet willing to abandon 
traditional forms of political theory entirely (as Take Three will 
Kokaz, Theorizing International Fairness, in GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
65, 71–72 (Christian Barry & Thomas W. Pogge eds., 2005). 
 75. This may be symptomatic of a larger fault with contemporary political theory about 
global justice: a failure to closely engage with institutions.  See Christian Barry & Thomas 
W. Pogge, Introduction to GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1, 1–2 (Christian 
Barry & Thomas W. Pogge eds., 2005). 
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explore), then what are our options?  One possibility is to take seriously 
the “global” aspect of global justice in the following respect: to examine 
what normative possibilities are created by the ways in which 
globalization is changing social relationships. 
In particular, the question of a truly global justice requires us to 
consider the relationship between justice and society—in this case the 
possibility of global society.76  Can we really speak of global justice 
independent of the question of whether there is a global society?77
Liberal internationalism can try to do so by focusing on the foreign 
policy commitments of liberal states, but as Take One demonstrated, 
this approach has its limits.  Moreover, do obligations of justice depend 
on the prior existence of a certain, specific kind of global social 
relationship; namely, community?78
Two branches of justice theory present this challenge most acutely: 
the social contract tradition and the communitarian approach to justice.  
Both present the limiting factor to justice in terms of social 
relationships.  Contractarians cite the absence of a social contract 
beyond national borders, and communitarians require even more: 
communal bonds, expressed in terms of shared traditions, practices, and 
understandings that go beyond social contract requirements. 
Accordingly, these two branches represent a specific kind of 
challenge to the possibility of global justice; namely, that global justice 
requires a kind of global society or community that we simply do not 
have, and maybe cannot have.  But that is where globalization comes in.  
In my view, globalization is creating the possibility for exactly those 
sorts of relationships, thereby opening the door to new normative 
possibilities.79  As communitarianism is the more stringent of the two,80
I will confine myself, within the limits of this Article, only to 
consideration of the communitarian form of this argument.81
 76. Here, I am speaking of social relations among individuals and groups of 
individuals, not a global “society of states.”  See Garcia, Theory of International Law, supra
note 29, at 10–12.  
 77. David R. Mapel & Terry Nardin, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 3, 3–4 
(David R. Mapel & Terry Nardin eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1998). 
 78. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9, at 9. 
79. Id.
 80. By requiring community, and not merely society, communitarians go beyond the 
criteria established by social contract theory; therefore, if one can meet the stringent 
standards of the communitarians, by implication, one has gone a long way towards meeting 
the standards of the contractualists as well. 
81. See John Linarelli, What Do We Owe Each Other in the Global Economic Order?: 
Constructivist and Contractualist Accounts, 15 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 181
(2006) (offering an overview of contractualist approaches to global economic justice issues). 
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A. The Model 
Essentially, communitarians maintain that justice is a property of 
certain groups.  Taking Michael Walzer’s work as an example, the 
communitarian position is that global justice is not possible because we 
lack the sort of social relations on a global level, which make justice 
possible in domestic society.82
According to Walzer, distributive justice is relative to social 
meanings.83  Only in domestic societies do we find the shared practices, 
traditions, and understandings which define what justice is, and which 
help create the social solidarity and sense of common purpose necessary 
to support the sacrifices and obligations of justice.84  In Walzer’s words, 
justice “is rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, 
things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life.”85  Unless these 
kinds of social relationships exist, there is no possibility of justice.86
Given that for Walzer it is a society’s shared life which determines 
justice, and not the other way around, justice requires a prior 
community in which all relevant distributive decisions take place 
according to shared traditions, practices, and understandings of justice.87
In such communities, justice is determined by their shared 
understandings, not coercive of them—otherwise, justice would be 
tyranny.88  On this view, distributive justice “presupposes a bounded 
world within which distribution can take place: a group of people 
committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, first of all 
among themselves.”89
Given the nature of this community, there are necessary limits to 
the scope of justice.  It is only within particular communities that you 
can determine what justice consists of, and who owes justice to whom.  
Thus, Walzer and others argue that it is only within nations that justice 
makes sense.90  Determining what justice might be requires a historical 
analysis of that society’s shared life, not an a priori argument or a 
rational reconstruction of their beliefs.91  In other words, justice requires 
 82. This account is drawn from my treatment of Walzer in Garcia, Global Community,
supra note 9.  See WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 18. 
 83. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9 at ch. 1. 
84. Id. at 16. 
 85. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE supra note 18, at 314. 
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 313.  
89. Id. at 31. 
 90. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9, at 19. 
91. Id.
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a shared understanding of social goods.  Only political communities 
have such shared understandings, and the preeminent example is the 
nation-state.92  Therefore, we are justified in preferring compatriots over 
non-compatriots in many sorts of distributions, including economic 
benefits.93
This is where globalization comes in.  It is my contention that 
globalization itself is changing the nature of this argument.94  I am not 
suggesting that, at this point in our history, global social relations form 
the sort of full-blown political community which communitarians find 
in domestic social relations.95  In my view, however, globalization is 
creating a third alternative, something between the nation state and a 
global community, consisting of “limited” degrees of community.96
This means that global society, taken as a whole, may not rise in all 
cases to the level of community which communitarians posit, but has 
enough elements of community, and contains enough pockets of 
community, to support an inquiry into justice in at least in some areas of 
global social relations.97  In order to illustrate this, I will examine in 
greater detail two particular aspects of globalization—the globalization 
of knowledge and the globalization of regulation—in which this change 
is salient. 
First, globalization is creating a community of knowledge.  
Through globalization we know a great deal, immediately and 
intimately, about the suffering of people in other parts of the world, 
more so now than at any time in the past.98  Such knowledge satisfies a 
basic requirement for community—that we have the capacity to know 
one another’s needs, concerns, and preferences.99  Moreover, this flow 
of information is not simply about global harms to “poor Others.”  
Globalization is also contributing to a shared sense of vulnerability to 
“remote” forces, even among citizens of wealthy, developed nations.100
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 12–14.  
95. Id. at 21. 
 96. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9, at 21. 
97. Id. at 13–14. 
 98. HELD, supra note 3, at 58 (asserting that the globalization and telecommunications 
revolution brings people into other social realities they otherwise would not know). 
99. See David Miller, The Ethical Significance of Nationality, 98 ETHICS 647, 653 
(1988) (citing BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991)) (noting the importance of media in allowing 
dispersed bodies of people to think of themselves as belonging to a single community). 
 100. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 516 (2005) (“We [meaning the U.S.] also may feel the 
growing significance of ‘remote’ forces on our lives, whether those forces are multinational 
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This kind of knowledge is an important element in the 
communitarian argument for community as a prerequisite of justice, 
because it is within community that we have the knowledge of each 
other that is necessary for justice to work at all.101  This knowledge 
forms the basis for the social determination of “need” and “whose needs 
count,” as well as the basis for Walzer’s shared understandings.  In this 
way, such knowledge about each other is the basis for creating 
solidarity—that leap of the moral imagination which says that your 
concerns are my concerns. 
One specific type of shared knowledge important to globalization 
is the growing recognition of the risks we share as human beings on this 
planet, and of our shared interest in addressing those risks.  In this 
sense, globalization is “de-territorializing” risk, creating what has been 
called a “community of risk.”102  The literature is remarkably consistent 
in its listing of common risks facing all human beings: war and security 
challenges; climate change and environmental degradation; economic 
crises and increased economic competition and dislocation; infectious 
disease and global pandemics; natural disasters; and rapid population 
growth, to name a few.103  Moreover, the desire for security, 
environmental health, and sustainable development, for example, are 
not unique to any one specific culture.104
The mere fact that shared risks exist is not by itself enough to 
create community.105  In order to see a sense of community emerge 
from the mere recognition of shared risks, we need to look at how we
are responding, which brings me to my second point about the 
globalization of institutions.  This community of knowledge and risk is 
increasingly becoming a community of shared traditions, practices, and 
understandings concerning how we respond to such risks.106  These 
grow, both spontaneously and institutionally, out of our perception of 
corporations, global terrorist organizations, world capital markets or distant bureaucracies 
such as the European Union.”). 
 101. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9, at 27. 
 102. PAUL KENNEDY ET AL., GLOBAL TRENDS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 158–59 
(2002).
103. Id.  President Obama alluded to this in his September 23, 2009 remarks to the 
U.N.G.A., in which he said the self-interests of states have never been more aligned than 
they are today.  President Barack Obama, First Speech to the United Nations General 
Assembly (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/23 
/obama.transcript/index.html.  
104. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The “International Community”: Facing 
the Challenge of Globalization, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 266, 272 (1998) (listing bases for a 
dialogue on a minimal set of common values). 
 105. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9, at 28. 
106. Id. at 29. 
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shared needs and interests, our capacity to help and to harm, and our 
awareness of each other’s plight—in short, our understanding of 
globalization as interlocking our fates.107  I would like to focus on two 
particular types of contemporary shared practices, markets and meta-
state institutions, as highlighting the interplay between globalization and 
our community-building responses to shared risks.108
Insofar as globalization is creating a global market society, this in 
itself is a shared practice or set of practices, albeit quite complex, 
contributing to a community of interests.109  The advanced capitalist 
form of market society practiced by the most developed countries is not, 
of course, implemented in identical ways, even in all market societies. 
Nevertheless, market society has certain attributes—the need for 
bureaucratic regulation, recognition of private property, and functioning 
civil courts, to name a few—which by virtue of their significant spill-
over effects, contribute to the formation of shared interests among 
participants.110  Not the least of these is an interest in developing 
institutions which supplement and mitigate the rigors of capitalism, 
compensating the “losers” through some form of wealth transfer.111
Perhaps the strongest evidence of an emerging global community 
involves our recognition of a shared need to look to institutions beyond 
the state, in order to frame an adequate social response to many of the 
problems and challenges we face.112  In other words, the need for 
increased global governance is itself a shared understanding, and the 
reality of global governance by its nature constitutes a shared 
practice.113  Social regulation today is increasingly conducted through a 
complex partnership, consisting of states and their constituent units, 
international organizations, and non-state actors through mechanisms 
such as the market, all regulated or established through international 
law.114  From a distributive justice perspective, globalization is 
revealing domestic society as an incomplete community, incapable of 
107. Id.
108. Id. at 30. 
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., DON SLATER & FRAN TONKISS, MARKET SOCIETY: MARKETS AND MODERN 
SOCIAL THEORY 92–116 (2001) (surveying the range of institutions which markets require 
and/or are embedded in). 
 111. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9, at 31. 
112. Id.
113. Id.
 114. “[T]he institutions and quasi-formal arrangements affecting persons’ life prospects 
throughout the world are increasingly international ones – international financial 
institutions, transnational corporations, the G8, the World Trade Organization . . . .” 
CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE: DEFENDING COSMOPOLITANISM 8 (1999). 
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securing the overall well-being of its members by itself, thus prompting 
us to look to a higher level of community as part of group efforts to 
secure well-being.115
The role played by common institutions, sharing a common 
language in building polities out of disparate peoples, has long been 
recognized in domestic politics as “nation-building.”116  For example, in 
the U.S. we reinforce our shared identity as a nation when, together, we 
look to the federal level for resource allocations and policy responses, 
as in the case of natural disasters or security crises.117  Similarly, our 
tendency to look, at least in part, to meta-state institutions for responses 
to social and environmental problems globally, reflects a shared 
understanding that such institutions play an increasingly prominent role 
in formulating or channeling social policy decisions and orchestrating 
social welfare responses, and that few states can act without them on 
any important social issue.118
If one is willing to accept, even provisionally, that globalization is 
leading in some manner or degree to the emergence of a global 
community of some kind, then the stage is set for an examination of a 
communitarian approach to global justice.  However, this undertaking 
poses quite a complex set of questions.  If, despite the effects of 
globalization, there is still no comprehensive community at the global 
level, then it will not be possible to develop as comprehensive a theory 
of global justice as, say, the liberal theory of foreign policy.  Instead, we 
might be limited to something along the lines of Michael Walzer’s 
“thin” approach to global justice, covering only those areas of overlap 
among normative communities.119  Alternatively, we might find that 
insofar as there is limited or partial community, it is liberal in nature 
(the global market, for example, on some accounts).  If so, we might 
find that a liberal theory of justice, first considered in Take One as 
limited to the foreign policy of liberal states, might be sustainable with 
regard to all participants—states and institutions alike—in the specific 
global community of the global market.120  In other words, we might 
 115. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9, at 23. 
 116. Will Kymlicka, Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in
BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE 249, 256 (David Miller & Sohail H. Hashmi eds., 2001). 
 117. Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9, at 34. 
118. Id.
 119. MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD
(1994).
 120. We might even find, in the end, that communitarian changes in global social 
relations make cosmopolitanism sustainable bit by bit—a sort of creeping 
cosmopolitanism—insofar as we see emerging pockets of liberal community. 
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find that a liberal theory of economic justice is an appropriately 
pluralistic theory of global economic justice for the global economy, 
because the global economy has been fashioned along liberal lines and 
reflects a consensus among participants on this basic point. 
Much more work needs to be done on these questions.121  For the 
moment, let me offer this set of suggestions regarding what kind of 
international law such an approach might support at this stage, along the 
lines of a “global minimal ethics.”122  If global community is emerging, 
at least in a limited form, then we need something like a global public 
law to structure it.123  This is the central opportunity (and challenge) 
which globalization offers to international law: to move from the public 
law of inter-state relations, to the public law of a global community.124
Such a shift at the global level may resemble the emergence at the 
regional level of a “European” law and a “European” economic 
community out of the many disparate states involved in the European 
integration process; a new legal order emerges out of a reconstituted 
(and constitutive) set of social relationships.125
With respect to global justice, such a process should involve a 
global system for safeguarding and delivering what can be called the 
“global basic package.”  This global basic package is a basic bundle of 
political, social, and economic rights, safeguarded through global law 
and delivered in a partnership between global and national institutions, 
in much the same way that political, social, and economic rights are 
safeguarded by Federal law and delivered through a variety of 
Federal/State partnerships in the U.S.  This list can be drawn in a variety 
 121. Such questions are part of a larger process of inquiry I am engaged in, of which 
Global Community is a preliminary prospectus.  Garcia, Global Community, supra note 9. 
 122. Dirk Messner, World Society—Structures and Trends, in GLOBAL TRENDS AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 33 (Paul Kennedy et al. eds., 2002).  Here I am thinking in more 
general terms, along the lines of what sorts of norms, albeit ‘thinner’ ones, could reflect the 
broadest possible support from a limited ‘global’ community.  A particular, deeper, ‘sub-
community’ of globalization, such as the global market, might be able to support a ‘thicker’ 
set of norms, as suggested above. 
 123. Global public law can be conceptualized as the organization of the structure of 
powers, duties, and limits of meta-state governance and its officers; relations of the meta-
state levels of governance (IOs) to the midrange (states) and to individuals; and the 
definition and exercise of powers of meta-state governance for the public good.  
Alternatively, one can think of it as the regulatory system for delivery of global public 
goods. See generally PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003). 
 124. Garcia, Theory of International Law, supra note 29, at 21. 
 125. For a recent overview of this process which emphasizes the role of legal 
institutions, see Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA.
J. INT’L L. 307 (2009). 
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of ways, but should involve, at a minimum, the following four elements: 
security, subsistence, liberty, and voice.126
We see the germ of a global basic package today in international 
human rights law and international trade law.  With respect to security 
and subsistence, international human rights law already recognizes a 
core commitment to deliver food, shelter, and some minimum level of 
security, as a function of our basic human rights.127  Through the WTO, 
multilateral international trade rules offer some guarantee of liberty to 
economic actors, enabling them to exercise their economic rights.  
However, there is still no effective mechanism for global wealth 
transfers at the scale necessary to support the global basic package; and 
there is no effective mechanism to deliver individual political 
representation or voice at the global level, on economic matters or 
otherwise.128  Continuing the work of “thickening” this model of global 
communitarian justice in economic and non-economic matters will 
require a sustained re-examination of core international legal doctrines 
and institutions, such as boundaries, sovereignty, legitimacy, 
citizenship, and the territorial control of resources, from the perspective 
of emerging global polities. 
B. Contributions and Limits of This Model 
The principal advantage of this approach is that it tries to directly 
address the question of global justice by articulating a basis for a global 
normative community.  On this view, globalization itself is in the 
process of creating a new global community, consisting of shared 
understandings, practices, and traditions capable of supporting 
obligations of justice at a global level.  Members of this global web of 
relationships are increasingly aware of each other’s needs and 
circumstances, increasingly capable of effectively addressing these 
needs, and increasingly contributing to these circumstances in the first 
place.  They find themselves involved in the same global market 
 126. The brief overview which follows is drawn from an earlier preliminary run-through 
of some of these issues.  See Garcia, Theory of International Law, supra note 29, at 21–26. 
 127. The fact that, in reality, this often amounts to very little, has lead commentators 
such as Jean Elshtain to argue that there is still no equivalent to the state, citing Arendt’s 
point that the only meaningful site for citizenship remains the state.  Annual Meeting of 
American Political Science Association Panel, Theorizing Globalization in a Time of War: 
Challenges and Agendas (Sept. 2, 2004).  
 128. Jay Mandle and Louis Ferleger refer to this as the need for institutional 
mechanisms for compensation and control, two fundamental elements of the regulation of 
global market society.  Jay Mandle & Louis Ferleger, Preface: Dimensions of Globalization,
570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 8 (2000).
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society, and together they look to the same organizations, especially 
those at the meta-state level, to provide regulatory approaches to 
addressing problems of global social policy. 
Having established a basis for global norms, this approach also 
offers the opportunity to reflect on what such norms might look like.  
Depending on the degree of global community one can identify, global 
norms may resemble “thick” domestic theories of justice, such as 
Justice as Fairness, or “thin” models of global justice along the lines of 
the global minimal ethics approach sketched out above.  In either case, 
what is significant is that such norms are understood to apply to all 
global participants, because they are justified by reference to the 
community relationships they are all a part of and they are all building, 
through their global activities.  Moreover, these norms can also be 
applied directly to international institutions qua institutions, a 
significant improvement over the limits of Take One.  These institutions 
are involved in meeting the globally shared needs of their communities 
through the allocation of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation 
such as rights, opportunities, privileges, membership, and resources: 
activities that have traditionally been understood in the domestic sphere 
to make justice both relevant and necessary. 
One important drawback to this approach, however, is that it 
tangles the question of global justice in controversial claims about the 
changing nature of global social relations.  There is an interesting 
analogy here to the history of international law itself.  For several 
centuries, international law was mired in a theoretical dispute over 
whether it was law at all, which largely turned on the fact that 
international society did not look like domestic society, and our models 
of law were drawn from domestic society: no international sovereign, 
no international law.129  The way out of this dispute was, in effect, to 
look out of the window and see that a lot of law-abiding was going on, 
regardless of the theory.130  In other words, we had to recognize that 
reality had bypassed theory. 
In a similar sense, it is costly to suspend attention to the many 
pressing tasks of global justice while we debate whether or not we are 
129. See Rafael Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1543 (2009). 
 130. In the famous words of Louis Henkin, “Almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” 
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed.1979) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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seeing global society, global community, or global justice.131  We do not 
see communitarian accounts of global justice in the literature, let alone 
communitarian-based critiques of existing global distributive 
institutions.  The fundamental work necessary for such an account has 
yet to be done at a global level, because the necessary preconditions to 
such an account are still in contention.  Thus, Take Two can be useful in 
helping us get to the point of global justice, but may not yet be much 
help in telling us what global justice might look like. 
IV. TAKE THREE - CONSENT, OPPRESSION, AND THE NATURE OF TRADE
ITSELF
Thus far we have considered two approaches to the question of 
global justice.  The first, in Take One, extends domestic principles of 
liberal justice to the question of transboundary justice problems, at least 
insofar as that is a reasonable goal for the foreign policy of liberal 
states.  Take Two examines the nature of global social relations, and 
argues that even assuming the stringent communitarian standard for 
obligations of justice, some degree of global community is in fact 
emerging, at least in certain areas, enough to support an inquiry into 
principles of justice. 
Both approaches are alike in having their strengths and 
weaknesses.  Each contributes something vital and will continue to be 
part of the global justice debate.  Even more fundamentally, however, 
both are limited by their proponents’ quest for a basis on which to 
constrain other actors.  Insofar as advocates of either view seek to assert 
normative claims against other participants, they both must pay 
attention to, and are ultimately limited by, the theoretical basis for such 
claims.  The liberal internationalist view cannot establish a basis for 
claims which bind anyone beyond liberal societies, leaving the question 
of global justice ultimately to unilateral action and the political process 
of global policy-setting institutions.  The global communitarian view 
seeks to transcend this problem by arguing for the emergence of some 
form or degree of global community, thus situating global justice 
squarely in the middle of controversial empirical and normative claims. 
What if there was another avenue that began, instead, closer to 
participants’ immediate experience of economic interactions, and which 
might offer a basis for mutually-agreed regulation which evades both 
the limits of particular normative communities and the ambiguity of 
131. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009) (arguing in favor of a more 
pragmatic, less theoretical (and divisive) approach to global justice). 
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global social relationships?  That is the experiment which this section 
undertakes. 
I propose to look at how economic interactions themselves have 
certain intrinsic requirements or characteristics which support what we 
might otherwise describe as just behavior.  Instead of working from first 
principles, this approach seeks to work from experience and the 
language that arises from experience.  In this way, it is hoped that the 
law can strengthen what is already working, and wrestle with what is 
not working, in such experience.132
I am suggesting in this Take that “consent” is that essential 
characteristic which makes economic exchanges “trade,” rather than 
theft, coercion, exploitation, or the like.  The hope is to identify aspects 
of trade law and trade agreements that look and act like trade, but are 
something else, and that damage the subject of trade because they do 
not reflect consent, therefore generating costs which impede the 
flourishing of trade.
A. The Model 
This model begins with the notion of trade as a transaction.133  We 
engage in many types of transactions, whether involving money, goods, 
ideas, services, affinity, or information.  However, if we think of what 
distinguishes trade from the many other exchanges we participate in, it 
is that trade involves a transfer of economic value. 
There are many different types of transactions involving a transfer 
of value.  For example, gifts are transactions involving a transfer of 
value, but one of their distinguishing characteristics is their unilateral 
nature: the gift-giver transfers something of value for nothing in return.  
In contrast, trade transactions are bilateral, or mutual, in nature, 
involving a bilateral exchange of economic value. 
Theft is another type of unilateral transaction, helpful in clarifying 
the nature of trade.  A theft involves an involuntary transfer of value.  It 
could be said that theft is not trade because it is unilateral, but a simple 
thought experiment clarifies that this is not the essence of the 
 132. This approach is based on an ongoing project involving the role of consent in trade 
law. See Frank J. Garcia, Is Free Trade “Free”? Is It Even “Trade”? Oppression and 
Consent in Hemispheric Trade Agreements, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 507 (2007) 
[hereinafter Garcia, Free Trade]; see generally DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER
BROWNSWORD, CONSENT IN THE LAW (2007) (analyzing the role of consent in public and 
private law). 
 133. The overview which follows is drawn from Garcia, Free Trade, supra note 132, at 
507–10.
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distinction.  A thief could give you a cheap watch in return for your 
wallet, but it would still be a theft despite its bilateral quality.  Thus, 
trade must also be voluntary, which introduces the key notion of 
consent—both parties must consent to the transaction or there is some 
element of theft.  The role of voluntariness is reflected in our language.  
We can speak of good trades versus bad trades in terms of meeting our 
goals, and yet we distinguish bad trades from “rip-offs” or thefts.  We 
would not refer to the experience of being robbed as a “bad trade,” 
except in a deliberately ironic sense. 
Another aspect to the voluntariness of bilateral exchange can be 
expressed through the notion of bargain.  Bargaining, or the process of 
reaching mutually agreeable terms, is often a necessary element in 
reaching consent.  Even where parties to an exchange do not actually 
bargain, the exchange presumes the freedom of both parties to consider 
and propose a variety of possibilities on the road to saying yes or no.  
Otherwise, if either of the parties were not able to bargain freely, the 
resulting transaction might still be voluntary in a basic sense, but 
something has been lost.  This is more like coercion than trade. 
This notion of bargained-for consent is reflected in our law 
through the concept of a “meeting of minds.”  The meeting of minds in 
contract law, even as a constructive notion, is key to the whole system 
for enforcing promises.  If we look at the key justifications for getting 
out of a contract—mistake, duress, or fraud—we see that they reflect 
the absence of bargained-for consent.
In summary, by examining our experiences and language of 
economic exchange, I have constructed a notion of trade as consisting 
of voluntary, bargained-for exchanges of value among persons for 
mutual economic benefit.  Based on this preliminary inquiry, several 
alternatives to trade (i.e., other economic interactions that we do not 
consider trade) can be examined in order to paint a fuller picture of what 
trade is and what it is not.  In doing so, I rely primarily on the work of 
Simone Weil, the 20th century French philosopher, known for her frank 
examination of the role of consent and its absence in distinguishing 
between economic transactions and economic oppression.134
134. See ADRIENNE RICH, For a Friend in Travail, in AN ATLAS OF THE DIFFICULT
WORLD: POEMS 1988–1991, at 51 (1991) (“What are you going through? she said, is the 
great question. / Philosopher of oppression, theorist / of the victories of force.”). “She” 
being Simone Weil, who wrote, “The love of our neighbor in all its fullness simply means 
being able to say to him: “What are you going through?” See SIMONE WEIL, WAITING FOR 
GOD 115 (Capricorn Books 1959) (1951).  Many thanks to Kim Garcia for introducing me 
to Weil and suggesting the connection between Weil’s thought and trade. 
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In the previous discussion on the nature of exchange, the concept 
of theft as a contrast to trade was introduced.  Essential to this 
distinction is the absence of consent on the part of the one surrendering 
economic value.  Weil writes that one cannot seek consent where there 
is no power of refusal.135  Thus, where there is no power to refuse, there 
is no trade because there can be no consent.136
At the private-party level, contract law recognizes this difference 
through the concept of duress: a defense to the finding of a contractual 
obligation.  In other words, where one party’s consent to enter into a 
contract was not freely given, but was given under some form of 
pressure, the law will not recognize this as a meeting of minds and will 
not find a contract. 
In economic terms, the equivalent to theft—transactions which are 
not mutual and where consent is not present—can be called extraction 
or predation; add a political element and we call it economic dominance 
or colonialism.137  In these cases, an economic benefit flows from one 
party to the other, but it is not mutual in a meaningful sense, and most 
importantly, it is not consensual.  Rather, the economic benefit in these 
cases is achieved through power inequalities as expressed by economic 
or military force.138  Such transactions are not consistent with our 
concept of trade as outlined above; they are, instead, a form of wealth 
extraction in the purest colonial sense. 
Short of predation, we can recognize a more subtle weakening of 
consent, involving what I will call coercion.  Coercion occurs when a 
transaction is mutual, and in some basic way consensual, but something 
weakens the fullness or freedom of the consent, short of outright theft or 
duress.  This usually involves a restriction on the range of possible 
bargains that the parties are free, or not free, to propose and consider.  
Thus, coercion presupposes an inequality in bargaining power, where 
one party works to limit the range of possibilities “on the table,” so to 
speak.
As with duress, contract law also reflects this distinction.  The law 
provides particular protections for consumers and those with weaker 
bargaining power when they deal in what the law calls “adhesion 
 135. SIMONE WEIL, Justice and Human Society, in SIMONE WEIL 116, 123 (Eric O. 
Springsted ed., 1998) [hereinafter WEIL, Justice and Human Society]. 
 136. Garcia, Free Trade, supra note 132, at 511. 
 137. The discussion which follows is drawn from Garcia, Free Trade, supra note 132, at 
511–12.
138. Id.  There remains the difficult issue of determining the limits of acceptable 
“influence” or persuasion between states (through forms of soft power, for example), which 
the discussion of coercion below only partly answers. 
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contracts:” contracts with commercial parties or manufacturers who 
possess greater bargaining power.  In such cases (where a dealer says “if 
you want this, these are the terms and the only terms,” leaving the 
consumer unable to negotiate), courts will look carefully before 
assuming the consumer consented to the adverse terms of the contract, 
despite the fact that, in all other material respects, it looks as if a 
contract was voluntarily entered into.  Courts will not automatically 
void such a contract, as would be the case with duress, but they will 
look closely at the contract and may not enforce all of its provisions. 
I am relying on the work of Hillel Steiner to consider a third useful 
contrast, that between trade and exploitation.139  In addition to the 
requirements that trade be a bilateral, voluntary exchange, Steiner adds 
a third element: that the two transfers are of roughly equal value.140
Where two transfers are not of equal value, yet the exchange is 
voluntary, Steiner characterizes this as evidence of exploitation.141
Exploitation can have many causes, but the illustration Steiner 
offers is of a market for services in which the top bid, the one the 
service provider ultimately accepts, does not reflect the maximum 
possible value of the services.  It is simply the top bid in that market at 
that time.142  However, Steiner does not rely on an objective theory of 
value to characterize the bid as inadequate.143  Instead, he suggests we 
look at other parties who might have bid, and perhaps bid more, but for 
various reasons did not.144
Among the reasons other parties may not have bid—reasons which 
may indicate exploitation—he includes the possibility that earlier rights 
violations occurred, such that the potential offerors either lacked the 
resources to bid, despite an interest in doing so, or were prevented from 
 139. Hillel Steiner, Exploitation Among Nations (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author) [hereinafter Steiner, Exploitation]; see generally Hillel Steiner, A Liberal 
Theory of Exploitation, 94 ETHICS 225 (1983–84) (analyzing exploitation in terms of prior 
rights violations). 
 140. By rough equality, I mean (and I take Steiner to mean) that both parties consider 
the exchange fair—there is an appropriate relation, in their eyes, between what they are 
giving and what they are receiving.  See DAVID MILLER, MARKET, STATE AND COMMUNITY:
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET SOCIALISM 175 (1989) [hereinafter MILLER,
MARKET, STATE AND COMMUNITY] (explaining that exploitation consists of the use of 
special advantages to deflect markets away from equilibrium, defined as exchanges 
involving equivalent value). 
 141. Steiner, Exploitation, supra note 139, at 2. 
142. Id. at 3. 
 143. Steiner has been criticized for this, though in my view unpersuasively.  See, e.g.,
MILLER, MARKET, STATE AND COMMUNITY, supra note 140, at 180. 
 144. Steiner, Exploitation, supra note 139, at 3–4. 
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participating in the auction due to governmental interference.145  In 
either case, the result for the service provider is that they accept a 
voluntary mutual exchange, but for less than they might otherwise have 
received.  In other words, the transaction is consensual and mutual, yet 
exploitative, because a potentially higher-paying third party was not 
able to participate in the auction.146
When applied to trade, this suggests that where certain third-party 
states and/or citizens are kept out of markets, or are economically 
unable to participate effectively in markets, an offeror suffers a 
detriment because he or she receives a lower bid from someone else.147
Therefore, the resulting exchanges between that offeror and the ultimate 
purchaser are not trade, but rather exploitation.148  This differs from 
coercion in that the force, pressure, or rights violation occurs with 
respect to the third party, not between the two primary parties to the 
transaction.149  Nevertheless, this affects our evaluation of the 
consensual nature of the resulting transaction, in that the offeror’s 
consent was granted among a restricted range of choices.150
To summarize, the essence of trade, as defined here, is consent to a 
voluntary, mutual, bargained-for exchange of roughly equal value.151  I 
have suggested three other types of transactions which, while they may 
look somewhat like trade, do not in fact meet the definition: predation, 
coercion, and exploitation.152  Participants in any of these three 
transactions will see economic value exchange hands, and society may 
reap some economic benefit, but this occurs under conditions involving 
the absence or impairment of consent.153
145. Id. at 6. 
146. Accord MILLER, MARKET, STATE AND COMMUNITY, supra note 140, at 177, 186 
(providing that it is in the nature of exploitation that the exploited party is unable to consider 
alternative, more attractive hypothetical transactions, due to the exploiter’s use of unfair 
advantage).  Miller considers the rights-violation theory of exploitation too narrow. For my 
purposes here, it is enough to note that such a case would be exploitation, even if, as Miller 
argues, other cases should also qualify.  See also Garcia, Normative Critique, supra note 31, 
at 181–82. 
 147. Garcia, Free Trade, supra note 132, at 514. 
 148. Steiner, Exploitation, supra note 139, at 6.  In the inter-state context, we are again 
presented with the question of what level of interference is acceptable ‘pressure’ and what 
rises to the level of exploitation.  It is easier to mark the clear cases at one end of the 
spectrum (illegal use of force, human rights violations) than it is to map out the middle zone. 
 149. Garcia, Free Trade, supra note 132, at 514. 
150. Id.  For an example drawn from this hemisphere’s experiences with the Monroe 
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Based on this understanding of trade, I would argue that the policy 
goal of international trade law can now be seen as more than simply 
eliminating economically distorting domestic legislation.  The goal is to 
maintain an environment in which trade can take place, and flourish, 
much as the goal of economic regulation in a domestic setting is to 
protect and promote a healthy market.  A consent approach to trade law 
suggests that in matters of global rulemaking, which today means 
principally economic rulemaking through trade agreements, we actually 
structure such negotiations to achieve and reflect the consent of their 
participants, aiming for substantive rules which protect and support 
consent at the private party level.  We do this not as a way of confining 
trade within a particular view, but as a way to promote its flourishing 
across the widest possible spectrum of individuals, transactions, and 
relationships.
First, this is going to require that we take the role of consent in 
trade negotiations seriously.  If trade consists of voluntary, bargained-
for exchanges, then the rules governing trade must preserve the 
possibility of bargained-for exchanges among private parties, and the 
rules themselves must be the fruit of such a bargain.154  If the rules of 
the game are not mutually agreed to, then any bargains struck under 
those rules are not fully free because they are not fully agreed to.155
Without consent, agreements structuring economic exchange will be a 
form of oppression, or worse, predation.156
In order to illustrate this point, I will refer to the Central America 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), a recent trade agreement between the 
U.S., five Central American states, and the Dominican Republic.157
One serious issue affecting the CAFTA negotiations is the problem of 
underrepresented groups.158  In Nicaragua, for example, during the 
CAFTA negotiations, there was widespread ignorance among most 
154. Id.
 155. Garcia, Free Trade, supra note 132, at 514.  I leave for another day the important 
question of whether any degree of failure of consent at level one (inter-state negotiations) 
fatally vitiates the possibility of true trade at level two (private party contracts).  I am 
grateful to my colleague Paulo Barrozo for raising this issue. 
156. Id. at 514–15. 
157. Id. at 515. 
158. Id.  While no government can hope to represent the full range of affected citizens, 
there is in my view an essential, if complex, relationship between consent at the state level 
and representation at the domestic level.  While one can justify this connection through 
liberal political theory, that is not my approach here.  Rather, it seems to me that if 
individual consent is an essential element in trade transactions, then some form of consent, 
or at least representation, with respect to the process of framing the rules for trade, must be 
an element. 
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affected groups regarding what CAFTA would do, and there were 
allegations of a campaign of disinformation on the part of the 
government.159  Many sectors of society were concerned that the new 
government only spoke for and negotiated on behalf of the moneyed 
interests, despite a recent history of social revolution.160  For these 
sectors, the treaty and its resulting economic activity are neither mutual, 
nor voluntary; the parties are not trading—something is being taken 
from them.161  In consent theory terms, the treaty does not create trade 
between the parties, but a form of theft or extraction.162
Even if CAFTA is both mutual and voluntary, we must still 
consider whether it represents the full consent of the parties.163  During 
the CAFTA negotiations, for example, it was often mentioned by the 
Nicaraguan government that the country did not have a real alternative 
to the treaty, due to the U.S. playing such a dominant role in the 
Nicaraguan economy as the principal source of capital and markets.164
Moreover, given the history of external domination of the southern 
hemisphere, both colonially and post-colonially, we must consider the 
possibility that other states in the region and elsewhere—states that 
might have offered more attractive alternative markets and sources of 
capital than the U.S.—may not have been able to do so.165  Put in the 
terms of this Article, this raises the possibility that the treaty may be 
exploitative.166
In summary, I am proposing that instead of beginning with 
traditional normative theory as an avenue towards global justice, we 
begin with an examination of the nature of trade itself, our language, 
and our experiences in economic exchange.  I am suggesting that such 
an examination reveals trade to consist of mutual and consensual 
exchanges of roughly equal value—and that the proper goal of 
international trade law is to safeguard the conditions for such 
exchanges, thereby ensuring that we are actually involved in trade, and 
not some form of predation, coercion, or exploitation.  Among other 
things, this implies a need for change in our approach to trade 
negotiations and to the social costs of trade rule enforcement.  In talking 
about issues such as exploitation, coercion, and human rights violations, 
159. Id. at 516. 
160. Id.
 161. Garcia, Free Trade, supra note 132, at 516. 
162. Id.
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we have reached key elements of the global justice agenda, but through 
a different doorway. 
 B. Contributions and Limits of This Model 
The strength of Take Three is that it achieves some of the goals of 
the first two, without the weaknesses.  First, by focusing on the nature 
of trade itself, it gives us a basis on which to regulate globally that, 
unlike cosmopolitanism or global communitarianism, does not depend 
on a prior normative consensus.  Instead, it identifies the appropriate 
regulatory goal of trade law: protect an environment in which trade can 
take place, and not predation, coercion, or exploitation.  If we cannot all 
agree on norms of economic justice, and we have not yet become a 
single global community of justice, what is our best avenue towards 
increasing the justice of our global economic relationships?  We 
safeguard the consent of the parties, and trust them not to enter into 
unfair bargains when they do not have to. 
Second, by highlighting consent, Take Three emphasizes a 
criterion very congenial to liberalism, but not by arguing for it as a 
matter of political theory.  Instead, it grows out of a close analysis of the 
meaning of our concept of trade itself.  Moreover, by focusing the law 
on maintaining a healthy regulatory environment for economic 
exchanges, this goal is articulated in a manner that is very congenial to 
business actors and economic interests generally: the law exists to 
support and protect a vigorous market. 
Third, by pointing us towards consent, Take Three gives us a good 
policy metric or benchmark (in much the way that liberal 
internationalism did with the Difference Principle) through which to 
evaluate trade rules and trade agreements.  Do they grow out of a 
consensual process?  Does a treaty represent the effective consent of 
states?  If so, does this consent include at least representation if not the 
consent of all of the affected groups in those states?  Do the substantive 
rules protect the consent of private parties?  If so, are they the sorts of 
rules which freely bargaining parties would have agreed to?  These 
inquiries require us to pose difficult questions with respect to 
negotiations: whether the states have anything resembling equal 
bargaining power; whether a negotiating government speaks for the full 
range of affected citizens (or whether it speaks for its people at all); and 
whether a government has an adequate alternative to a negotiated 
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outcome.167  Otherwise, we risk mistaking a mere form of consent for 
actual consent.168  These are not easy questions, but they are 
manageable—at least, we are used to working with them in evaluating 
domestic policy outcomes. 
One weakness of Take Three is that, like global 
communitarianism, it grounds the inquiry into global justice in a 
contestable, theoretical claim.  With respect to global 
communitarianism, the claim involved the nature of globalization and 
its effects on social relationships at the global level.  Here, the claim 
involves the nature of economic exchange and my exegesis of it, which 
could be challenged as idiosyncratic, simply wrong, or as confined to 
the experience of English-speaking Western participants in trade.  
However, it may be that the intuitions underlying this account are more 
general, and could be matched to the experience and language of other 
participants in economic exchange from other cultures and legal 
systems. 
A second weakness of Take Three may be that, like liberal 
internationalism, it does not give us a basis on which to constrain other 
parties in a hard, formal sense, nor would it necessarily furnish a basis 
on which to argue for significant wealth redistributions of the sort, 
which feature prominently on most global justice agendas.169  However, 
Take Three does offer a basis on which to regulate global trade towards 
substantively fairer transactions, one that does not presuppose or 
enforce a normative consensus.  Instead, it identifies consent as 
essential to the object of regulation itself: a thriving market for 
economic exchanges.  This may well have the power to attract support 
through an appeal to self-interest, which in the long run may be more 
significant than the power to compel obedience. 
 167. In negotiation theory, the latter is referred to as a party’s Best Alternative To a 
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).  If a party has no BATNA, it is in a very weak position.  
BATNA “is the only standard which can protect you both from accepting terms that are too 
unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept.”  ROGER FISHER 
& WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 100 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991). 
 168. Similarly, Weil writes that in looking purely at the fact of voting, democratic 
theory mistakes true consent for a form of consent, which can easily, like any other form, be 
mere form.  See WEIL, Justice and Human Society, supra note 135, at 126. 
 169. It may be that Take Three resembles liberal internationalism in another, 
paradoxical respect: by focusing on the consent of states, Take Three may also reinforce the 
primacy of states and hence trend more towards international justice rather than global 
justice.  I leave further exploration of this possibility to another day, and I am grateful to my 
colleague, Jeffrey Dunoff, for raising this issue. 
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CONCLUSION
A. Where Have We Been? 
This Article began with the question of how to articulate claims for 
global justice in a normatively pluralistic, globalizing environment.  In 
Take One, we looked at one response: frame global justice as a foreign 
policy commitment of liberal states, and leave it to their unilateral 
actions and multilateral advocacy to establish this justice through the 
many global policy forums which globalization is creating or 
strengthening.  This approach has the principal benefit of sidestepping 
the problem of global norms and working within established channels of 
state action, but at the cost of limiting the reach of global justice.  For 
this reason, I was led to characterize this approach as “international” 
justice.
In Take Two, we approached the question from a different 
direction, namely, by examining whether globalization was sufficiently 
changing the nature of global social relationships such that we could 
articulate justice in communitarian terms: as the shared traditions, 
practices, and understandings of an emerging global community with 
respect to “who gets how much of what social goods.”  This approach 
has the advantage of taking globalization and the possibility of truly 
global norms seriously, but suspends the realization of global justice 
pending continued social evolution and the resolution of debates over 
the nature and extent of global social relationships. 
In Take Three, we approached the question from yet another 
direction, by an examination of the phenomenon of economic exchange 
and our language for it.  Through this avenue, “trade” was characterized 
as consisting of voluntary, mutual, bargained-for exchanges of roughly 
equal value.  This allowed us to claim that the goal of international trade 
law should be to safeguard and promote the conditions necessary for 
such exchanges to flourish, and that protecting the true consent of the 
parties, both negotiating states and transacting private parties, was a 
principal means to this end.  The advantage of this Take is that, by 
adopting a “bottom-up” approach to characterizing the normative goal 
of trade law, we can arrive at something like global economic justice 
(read as “fair transactions”) through a market-oriented consensual 
process that parties from any normative tradition could recognize and 
support as essential to the proper functioning of the global economic 
system.  However, this approach does not offer a basis other than self-
interest on which to claim adherence, and might not be adequate for 
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larger projects of wealth redistribution, beyond promoting the 
conditions for fair economic transactions. 
B. Where Might We Be Going? 
One of the principal effects of the global justice debate is to raise 
the question of the proper purpose of international trade law, as law.  In 
order for law to be effective as regulation, it must begin with the 
clearest possible understanding of the phenomenon to be regulated.  
What is our objective?  What are we trying to ensure?  What are we 
trying to prevent?  What are we hoping to safeguard?  International 
trade law is no different in this respect. 
Since the end of the Second World War the public, ostensible goal 
of international trade law has been to promote free trade.  A 
considerable body of economic theory backs this up, and a remarkable 
policy apparatus, including the WTO, has emerged to implement this 
goal.170  However, I would argue that in a fundamental way we have 
gotten it wrong.  One way to understand the global justice debate is as 
evidence that we are dissatisfied with the limits of our own ambitions 
with respect to international trade law, given its increasing scope in a 
global economy and globalizing world. 
The consent analysis in Take Three suggests that we have focused 
too much on the “free” part and not enough on the “trade” part.  Most of 
us would not rally behind calls for open and unrestrained economic 
coercion, predation, or exploitation, but that is what “free trade” has 
become in many instances, because we have misunderstood the nature 
of trade itself.  When we ignore the role of consent in economic 
exchange, we risk facilitating coercion or exploitation, instead of 
promoting open economic exchanges.  The fact that in the process, our 
regulatory apparatus has reduced the domestic regulatory burden 
attendant to such transactions—the conventionally understood “free” 
part of trade—does not make the resulting transactions “trade,” nor does 
it restore their intended social benefit. 
Instead, trade law should be about facilitating a thriving trading 
environment at all levels of this emerging global market.  It is not to 
promote economic exchanges of any kind, provided they are free of 
protectionist domestic regulation.  That is not free trade.  The problem 
arises when the methods we use to advance trade, so to speak, undercut 
 170. PASCAL LAMY, ABOUT THE WTO—A STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
(2010), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm.
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trade itself because they undercut consent, both in the negotiations 
between nations and in the transactions which the rules facilitate.  This 
is really a new form of mercantilism—the view that trade law should be 
about my “market trouncing your market,” with law playing a dual role: 
supporting my market at home, and facilitating my trouncing your 
market internationally.  This is a disservice both to the economic 
opportunities which trade offers, and to law itself. 
This makes it critically important that we understand what it is we 
are trying to regulate and protect.  In a sense, the global economy has 
grown faster than our intelligent regulation of it.  Some see in this the 
natural tendency for law to lag behind social facts; others see in it a 
deliberate attempt to create a particular vision of the global market: the 
under-regulated market of robber baron capitalism.  It is probably a bit 
of both.  But if we understand trade more accurately, we can create an 
environment which, over time, can make us all wealthier by truly 
promoting a market and not an open space for exploitation.   
I have argued for why safeguarding consent is a key element in 
promoting a more just trading system, and thereby a more just global 
economy, by ensuring it is a trading system and not a disguised system 
for predation, coercion, or exploitation.  In closing, I would like to 
suggest two additional ways in which trade law can promote a 
flourishing market for the benefit of all participants. 
My first point involves internalizing the costs of enforcement.  
What do I mean by the costs of enforcement?  One of the functions of 
law in economic matters is to restrain the human tendency to seek profit 
for one’s self and to shift cost and risk onto other parties.  Economists 
describe this as the process of creating externalities.  It is no surprise 
that human beings in economic relationships should seek to advance 
their own interests, trying to shift risk and costs to others.  That is one 
reason we have law: to plan ahead for this tendency and build in certain 
safeguards.  In corporate matters, we expect that corporate actors will 
seek to maximize profit, transfer risk, and externalize cost, and we 
legislate with that in mind.  We consider economic law successful when 
it is effective in ensuring that parties who exercise control and derive 
profit bear an appropriate degree of risk and internalize their costs. 
This is true in international trade as well.  We have to be careful 
that in designing instruments to create global markets through treaties, 
we do not talk the rhetoric of trade while instead creating the reality of 
coercion.  If trade agreements are negotiated under circumstances in 
which our trade partners have no real possibility of consent, and 
significant sectors of their domestic societies have no way of expressing 
their consent or lack of consent, such a treaty is not going to promote an 
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effective trading environment.  Instead, such a treaty promotes 
instability to the degree to which it is coercive or exploitative, 
provoking resentment and unrest which often lead to violence by both 
citizens and governments.  This creates costs for the societies involved 
and ultimately for all of us, as we are faced with the prospect of 
supporting oppressive regimes solely to maintain the economic 
opportunities we have created through predation or coercion.171
If the use of such force is not internalized as a cost of that 
production, then the goods coming from a factory in such countries 
might seem cheaper, since labor costs are lower.  However, this would 
not be a true price, and consumers would not have an accurate reflection 
in the price of the costs they may also have to bear as taxpayers and 
citizens, resulting from the violence necessary to enforce that bargain.  
If, on the other hand, the costs of enforcement are internalized, then the 
full nature of the bargain will be clearer to consumers and to society as 
a whole, and it will be seen as the bad bargain it is.  Such an approach in 
the trade area would be similar to the “political risk” calculations made 
in the foreign investment area, and would be equivalent to adding a 
“social tax” to the cost of the goods. 
My second point involves a concern for the sustainability of trade 
relationships.  In terms of sustainability, it is important to recognize that 
trade is not solely a series of one-shot transactions.  In game theoretic 
terms, trade is a repeat game, in which partners must contemplate a 
series of ongoing exchanges.172  The self-interested calculation of what 
strategies and tactics to employ changes when one contemplates a 
repeat game, as opposed to a single iteration.  Approaches which may 
seem attractive for their short-term gains might seem less attractive if 
they depend on exploitation, coercion, or manipulation that can poison 
the well for future iterations of the game.  Over time, the oppressive 
nature of such agreements becomes clearer. 
Moreover, through a long-term relationship of economic 
exchanges, one gains knowledge of one’s partner, their economy, their 
strengths and weaknesses, their needs, and their aspirations.  Such 
knowledge brings with it increased responsibility.  Do we use that 
knowledge to increase our ability to manipulate, exploit, or coerce our 
partners?  Or do we build in safeguards to maintain a trade environment 
between us, in which we preserve the possibility of consensual bargains, 
171. See Daphne Eviatar, A Big Win for Human Rights, THE NATION, May 9, 2005, 
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050509/eviatar. 
172. See generally GEORGE J. MALAITH & LARRY SAMUELSON, REPEATED GAMES AND 
REPUTATIONS (2007). 
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even in the face of insider knowledge which we could exploit?  Thus 
long-term economic relationships have the potential to deepen the links 
between societies through trade, or promote resentment, oppression, and 
violence through the misuse of knowledge.  When individual actors lose 
sight of the repeat nature of trade, the law must step in and regulate with 
that view in mind. 
This can be put in a different context, namely, the global financial 
crisis and the failures of domestic economic regulation.  Because of an 
impoverished view of the free market, certain financial actors were 
allowed to pursue strategies which had tremendous short-term yields for 
them, but through a process which shifted the tremendous risks onto 
other parties.  When this collapsed, all of global society was left bearing 
the costs.173  This illustrates the risks for us and for trade law when the 
conditions for a healthy market are misunderstood by the regulators, and 
parties are allowed to operate for the short-term, while externalizing 
costs and risks.  If the global financial crisis and the global justice 
debate can together teach us anything, it is that the stakes are too high to 
allow us to structure the framework for global economic relations in 
such a manner. 
 173. Anup Shah, Global Financial Crisis, GLOBAL ISSUES, July 25, 2009, available at
http://www.globalissues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis#Acrisissoseveretheworld
financialsystemisaffected. 
